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The Impact of Participation: 
How Civil Society Organisations contribute to the Democratic 
Quality of the UN World Summit on the Information Society 
ABSTRACT 
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was held by the United Nations 
in 2003 to draft a programmatic declaration for the information age. The involvement of 
civil society organisations (CSOs) in the drafting process was innovative and led to 
WSIS becoming an especially instructive case in order to assess the potential of civil 
society participation in global governance. The author analyses the preconditions that 
were provided for CSOs to participate within this policy process and how it influenced 
the policy output. The all-encompassing rhetoric of the multi-stakeholder approach at 
WSIS and its good performance with regard to conceding access, transparency and 
inclusion to non-state actors suggest that the summit would be responsive to arguments 
from civil society and therefore a likely case for a deliberative policy process. However, 
the impact of CSOs on the policy documents has only been marginal. Despite 
favourable conditions for CSO participation, WSIS was not as responsive towards civil 
society arguments as could have been expected. A content analysis of policy documents 
and civil society statements with regard to three selected issue areas – Internet 
governance, intellectual property rights and communication rights – reveals that CSOs 
were, in many cases, not able to influence the outcome. Their argumentative input only 
led to minor changes in the policy documents. The case of the World Summit on the 
Information Society indicates that favourable conditions for CSO participation alone do 
not necessarily provide a solution for the democratic deficit in global governance. 
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The Impact of Participation: 
How Civil Society Organisations contribute to the Democratic 
Quality of the UN World Summit on the Information Society 
INTRODUCTION1 
When the United Nations (UN) organised the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) in Geneva in 2003, its innovative multi-stakeholder design was widely praised. 
The inclusion of non-state actors developed into one of the defining and legitimising 
goals of the summit. The WSIS ought to be “the scene of a new world dialogue, a new 
form of international communication based on the values of responsiveness, exchange, 
solidarity and sharing” (WSIS Executive Secretariat 2002: 3). The WSIS symbol stands 
for a flower, whose four petals around the dot on the ‘i’ represent governments, interna-
tional organisations, businesses and civil society organisations (CSOs), which all con-
tribute to the common vision of an ‘Information Society for All’ (WSIS 12.12.2003: 3). 
In fact, civil society organisations as well as other observers actively participated during 
the whole preparatory process as well as at the summit by contributing to the drafting 
process of the policy documents. When it became apparent that the summit would not 
be a success with regard to substance, the WSIS aspired even more strongly to promote 
the announced multi-stakeholder approach. The participation of civil society actors was 
supposed to allocate legitimacy to the policy output. 
In line with the deliberative approach to democracy (Habermas 1992; Cohen 1996; 
Elster 1998; Dryzek 2000), the World Summit on the Information Society could be a 
likely case in order to observe a democratic and legitimate decision-making process, as 
it provided favourable formal conditions for CSO participation. Formally, CSOs had a 
wide degree of access to the negotiations. The policy process was transparent in that it 
allowed full access to policy documents and background material. The WSIS also pro-
vided some, although not sufficient, measures to ensure inclusion of marginalised stake-
holders. This leads to the assumption that CSOs were able to bring in substantial argu-
ments and potentially shape the discussions and the policy output – in other words, that 
the WSIS was responsive to CSO demands.  
Despite the exhilarated rhetoric of the WSIS organisers with regard to the multi-
stakeholder approach at the WSIS and the assumptions that can be drawn from a delib-
erative approach to democracy, many CSOs were frustrated about their marginal impact 
on the policy output. They felt that they were more like a fig leaf, legitimising the pol-
icy outcome without having any real power to influence it. In the end, civil society drew 
                                                 
1  The case study contributes to the project “Legitimation and Participation in International Organisations” (B5) of 
the Collaborative Research Centre 597 “Transformations of the State”. 
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back from the official policy process and published its own Declaration of Principles 
‘Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs’ (WSIS 08.12.2003). This CSO criti-
cism suggests that favourable conditions for civil society participation and their input do 
not necessarily lead to an awareness of and reaction to their concerns in international 
policy processes. 
This case study evaluates the World Summit on the Information Society using crite-
ria for democratic quality based on a deliberative approach in order to see if it lived up 
to its demands. The criteria that were used to measure the participation of CSOs and 
their impact on the policy process by means of deliberation are   
(1) access of CSOs to deliberation;  
(2) transparency and access to information;  
(3) inclusion of all stakeholders; and  
(4) responsiveness of the WSIS documents to CSO concerns (Nanz and Steffek 
2005: 7).  
Even though the variables access, transparency, and inclusion will be taken into consid-
eration in order to indicate the relatively favourable preconditions for civil society par-
ticipation at WSIS, responsiveness is the focus of this paper. Responsiveness is the most 
decisive criterion when assessing the democratic quality of the negotiations, since it best 
captures the legitimacy of the policy output: responsiveness encompasses not only the 
CSO input that was incorporated into the final documents but also those arguments that 
have not been considered, provided that they were discarded after a rational discourse 
took place. In the deliberative approach to democracy, the latter instance would be an 
indicator for justification, whereas the first could be referred to as an adjustment. Justi-
fication means that governmental actors take the arguments of CSOs into account and 
justify their positions with regard to them. As justification is hard to observe directly in 
a document analysis of a stylised negotiation process such as the WSIS, it is here sub-
sumed under the indicator of responsiveness and assessed only indirectly by looking at 
how the contents of the documents changed over time. The variation over time adds to 
the understanding of how arguments of CSOs and other actors are being discussed, dis-
carded, or included in the course of the entire preparatory process.  
The paper proceeds as follows: First, it briefly introduces deliberative democracy as 
a way to enhance the democratic quality of an international decision-making process by 
securing civil society participation under certain conditions. Based on this democratic 
ideal, the four indicators are developed as benchmarks which are then used to measure 
the World Summit on the Information Society. Second, it gives an overview of the in-
volvement of civil society actors in the World Summit on the Information Society in 
Geneva 2003 and its preparatory phase. Third, access to the negotiations, transparency 
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of the documentation and the inclusiveness of the negotiations are analysed in order to 
assess the preconditions for civil society participation. Then, the paper gets to the core 
of the matter and analyses the influence of CSOs on the content of the policy output, a 
Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action, at various stages. Hence, it determines 
the responsiveness of the WSIS process towards CSO arguments by means of a content 
analysis of key policy and background documents with regard to three conflicting issues 
that have been discussed at WSIS. On the basis of the empirical evidence, conclusions 
are finally drawn on the democratic legitimacy of the WSIS. 
THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRATIC QUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL  
DECISION-MAKING 
Global Governance is a concept that describes not only the growing interdependence in 
our contemporary world and the decreasing ability of nation states to solve problems 
across national boundaries, it also highlights possibilities of governance beyond the na-
tion-state (Zürn 1998a). These new forms of governance through international institu-
tions which include a variety of actors other than governments potentially suffer from a 
democratic deficit. The involvement of civil society actors in global governance may be 
a possible cure for the frequently diagnosed democratic deficit of international politics 
and institutions.  
The increasing importance and the role of non-governmental and civil society or-
ganisations is stressed extensively in the global governance debate, a popular strand of 
International Relations literature (for an overview of the literature see the following 
reviews: Zürn 1998b; Risse 2002; Price 2003). Some researchers have empirically ana-
lysed whether civil society organisations matter in international policy processes at all, 
under what conditions this occurs and for what reasons and purposes (Princen and Fin-
ger 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000). Their involve-
ment in the United Nations in general and UN world summits in particular have been 
studied (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Clark, Friedmann et al. 1998; Hochstetler, Clark et 
al. 2000). On normative grounds, others have argued that CSOs should matter. Espe-
cially their potential to enhance international democracy by awarding legitimacy to in-
ternational decision-making processes has been discussed (Wolf 2002; Beisheim 2004; 
Nanz and Steffek 2004). 
This case study is based on normative and empirical guidelines by Nanz and Steffek 
(2005) for the analysis of the relationship between CSO participation and the legitimacy 
and democratic quality of international organisations (Steenbergen, Steiner et al. 2003; 
Steiner, Bächtiger et al. 2004). Their analytical framework is theoretically founded in 
the deliberative approach to democracy (Habermas 1992; Cohen 1996; Elster 1998; 
Dryzek 2000; Schmalz-Bruns 2002). The basic idea of deliberative democracy is that 
those who are affected by policy-decisions should take part in its formulation. The par-
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ticipation of citizens is seen as the constitutive aspect of democracy, without at the same 
time denying that there are other factors as well, such as the rule of law and the distribu-
tion of power. An ideal policy process would be founded on an exchange of reasonable 
arguments and justifications between all those who are affected. Public scrutiny and the 
consideration of all relevant concerns will always enhance legitimacy.  
The meaningful participation of citizens in decision-making processes seems to be 
especially important in international policy-making due to a widely perceived democ-
ratic deficit. Representatives of national governments in international organisations only 
indirectly represent the citizens worldwide, although their decisions have far-reaching 
consequences (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 314). An approximation to the deliberative ideal 
of democracy could make decisions made in international organisations more legiti-
mate.  
Civil society organisations are key actors in this process as they are understood to be 
a transmission belt between the citizens and the policy-makers. They observe interna-
tional policy processes, report back to their constituency and empower marginalised 
groups to actively participate in policy-making (Nanz and Steffek 2004: 315). This case 
study assesses whether the meaningful participation of CSOs could be a cure to the de-
mocratic deficit of international governance. The normative criteria of access, transpar-
ency, inclusion and responsiveness serve as benchmarks which measure the degree and 
type of civil society participation at (and therefore the democratic quality of) the World 
Summit on the Information Society. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AT THE WSIS 
The World Summit on the Information Society is organised by the International Tele-
communication Organisation (ITU), a specialised agency of the United Nations, and 
which took place in two phases. Its first phase, leading to the summit in December 2003 
in Geneva, is the object of investigation in this paper, whereas its second phase culmi-
nated in a second summit in November 2005 in Tunis2.  
The governmental representatives gathered at the WSIS to develop a framework or a 
common vision of an information society to bridge the digital divide3. The ‘information 
society’ is a loosely defined and contested concept, and an uncommon issue on the 
                                                 
2  An extension of the analysis on the second summit in Tunis 2005 and a comparison of the two WSIS phases may 
lead to further understanding of civil society participation and the legitimacy of the policy output of WSIS. This 
has not been the focus of this article but is currently being analysed by the author in her dissertation project at the 
Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, Germany. 
3  “Digital divide” means the unequal distribution of information and communication technologies nation- and 
worldwide, which widens the gap between those who have access to ICT and those who don’t. 
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global policy agenda.4  At the WSIS it comprised a variety of issues, ranging from the 
regulation of the Internet to communication rights to reaching the UN Millennium 
Goals through Information and Communication Technology (ICT), often leading to 
conflicts between economic and societal or developmental claims.  
The preparatory process of the WSIS was comprehensive (see Fig. 1). In nearly two 
years six preparatory conferences, five regional conferences and one intersessional 
meeting were held. A large amount of written documentation was produced and several 
conflicts were discussed so extensively and controversial that even the three newly con-
voked ‘last-minute’ PrepComs 3a, b and c were not able to solve them.  
Figure 1:  The WSIS process timeline 
PC1 PC2 Intersessional PC3 PC3a PC3b/c WSIS 
Geneva Geneva Meeting,Paris Geneva Geneva Geneva Geneva 
| | | | | | | 
1-5July 17-28Feb 15-18July 15-26Sep 10-14Nov 5-6/9Dec 10-12Dec 
2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003  
Regional Conferences: 
¾ African: 25-30 May 2002, Bamako (Mali) 
¾ Pan European: 7-9 November 2002, Bucharest (Romania) 
¾ Asia-Pacific: 13-15 January 2003, Tokyo (Japan) 
¾ Latin America and Caribbean: 29-31 January 2003, Bávaro (Dominican Republic) 
¾ Western Asia: 4-6 February 2003, Beirut (Lebanon)  
Two documents were passed at the WSIS in 2003: a Declaration of Principles and a 
Plan of Action, which are neither visionary nor binding; rather, they are the least com-
mon denominator between governments and merely outline the agenda for the imple-
mentation of a world wide information society. Whereas the WSIS can be criticised due 
to the vagueness of its subject, its difficulties when reaching out to a broader public, or 
its disability to provide concrete solutions for those that are actually affected by the 
digital divide, it has been an innovation; not so much with regard to substance, but re-
garding the actual process.  
The organisers of the WSIS declared that they will involve all stakeholders already in 
the preparatory phase and asked civil society, businesses and international organisations 
to shape the negotiations and to participate in drafting the documents (WSIS Executive 
Secretariat 2002: 3; Kleinwächter 2004b: 34). Civil society participation was institu-
tionalised in the Civil Society Division of the WSIS Executive Secretariat. This ambi-
                                                 
4  Information and communication have been on the global agenda twice: 1948 at the UN Conference on the Free-
dom of Information and from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s during the debate on the New World Information 
and Communication Order. For further reading see (Kleinwächter 2004b; Ó Siochrú 2004). 
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tious policy design evolved as a benchmark of success for the summit. Civil society 
demanded the actual implementation of this approach, which proved to be difficult in 
the absence of viable rules and procedures. The multi-stakeholder approach was con-
stantly under discussion at the preparatory conferences and a reason for severe contro-
versies. Its implementation evolved over time and through a mutual learning process, 
both on the side of civil society as well as governments.  
Table 1:  Participation of representatives of different stakeholder groups during the 
preparatory process and the WSIS 
Representatives of PrepCom1 PrepCom2 PrepCom3 WSIS 
  %  %  %  % 
Governments  607 66 910 59 889 54 3.759 42 
NGOs/CSOs  223 24  394 25 537 32 3.425 39 
International  
Organisations  56 6  186 12 164 10 1.157 
13 
 
Business Sector  
Entities 34 4 60 4 68 4 525 6 
Total 920 100  1.550 100 1658 100 8.866 100 
Sources: ITU (2002), Final List of Participants, PrepCom1, 1-5 July 2002, Short Form, 5 July 2002 5; WSIS Prep-
Com2 Participant Information6, WSIS PrepCom3 Participant Information7; ITU (2003), Final List of Participants, 28 
January 20048, own calculations.  
Table 1 illustrates that civil society participation is relatively high in comparison to 
other stakeholder groups and that it increased steadily. In the run-up of the summit it 
matched almost the number of representatives from governments that were accredited.9 
Interestingly, the private sector has by far not been as present as CSOs.  
Civil society participation did not only rise in quantity, but complex civil society 
structures emerged over time during the preparatory process. The structure is multi-
layered and may be divided into entities with different functions. The involvement of 
                                                 
5  http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/pc1/administrative/list_participants_short.pdf (last access 15.02.2006). 
6  http://www.itu.int/wsis/participation/prepcom2/ (last access 15.02.2006). 
7  http://www.itu.int/wsis/participation/prepcom3/ (last access 15.02.2006) 
8  http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/summit_participants.pdf (last access 15.02.2006). 
9  In relation to the non-governmental participation on other UN world summits, the WSIS is not outstanding. At 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio (1992), 2,400 CSO representatives were accredited 
while 17,000 people attended the parallel NGO Forum (http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html, last access 
15.02.2006). At the WSSD 2002 in Johannesburg, 8,092 individuals of 925 organisations were representing the 
so called ‘major groups’, which comprised CSO as well as private sector representatives. 
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/major_groups/mgroups_wssd_participants.pdf (last access 
15.02.2006).  
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civil society at WSIS was institutionalised by a top-down approach through organisa-
tional structures provided by the UN, but also developed from below in a process of 
self-organisation (Padovani and Tuzzi 2004). 
The UN installed the Civil Society Division of the WSIS Executive Secretariat 
(CSD). It was included in the tripartite WSIS structure from early on, along with a divi-
sion for governments and the private sector. The CSD enabled civil society participa-
tion, e.g. by providing a web page. It worked as a knowledge disseminator and service 
provider for civil society. It distributed information and working material to CSOs and 
conducted workshops and seminars. It briefed CSOs about events pertinent to the sum-
mit and created contact and networking among civil society. The CSD also represented 
civil society concerns towards the media and other WSIS participants as well as in the 
Executive Secretariat. It processed requests for accreditation and participation and 
raised funds.10 After its adoption the CSD also acted as a secretariat for the Civil Society 
Bureau. 
In addition to this UN-initiated institutionalisation of CSOs, civil society created 
complex structures from below. The highest decision-making body of civil society is the 
Civil Society Plenary (CSP), which is a meeting open to all present during the prepara-
tory conferences and the summit itself. The CSP legitimises civil society action. For the 
time in between the actual meetings, a virtual CSP group was established.  
The main element of civil society that has been occupied with procedural (as op-
posed to content) questions was the Civil Society Bureau (CSB), which was founded 
during PrepCom2 as the great diversity and large number of CSOs active at the WSIS 
called for an additional coordination mechanism.11 It comprises representatives of each 
of the civil society groups (so-called families, working groups and regional caucuses) 
and had exclusive organisational functions: suggesting the representation of civil soci-
ety at the PrepComs and the summit; organising civil society events; and connecting the 
different groups within civil society.12 The real innovation was its close connection to 
the governments through consultation meetings between the Civil Society Bureau and 
the Governmental Bureau.  
                                                 
10  Civil Society & NGO Open Ended Bureau, Proposal, 30.01.2003, www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/ 
CS_Bureau_30Jan_ENG.doc (last access 15.02.2006).  
11  The foundation of the CSB was accompanied by severe critique from within civil society because of the fear that 
a hierarchical structure would emerge and the manner in which it was established was quite non-inclusive. 
Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, The proposed civil society bureau receives heavy criticism, but it will be too late to 
stop it, Geneva, 18.02.2003,  http://www.worldsummit2005.de/en/web/214.htm  (last access 15.02.2006). 
12  Ibid. 
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When it came to creating content, i.e. the argumentative input for the negotiations, 
the diverse caucuses and working groups, which were organised into families, and the 
Content and Themes Group (CS C&T) were key entities. The ground-level work was 
done in seven regional and more than twenty thematic caucuses and working groups: 
Issues were discussed, arguments developed and statements produced. The considerable 
but still unsystematic input was compiled by the CS C&T. The group created draft ver-
sions of the Action Plan and the Declaration, priority lists, benchmarks and - in the end 
- an independent CS Declaration was issued, specifying a common civil society position 
and showing its disapproval of the official documents.  
This bottom-up process was probably the greatest and most sustainable success that 
civil society achieved at the WSIS: It independently organised a complex institutional 
structure in the course of the negotiations; it developed common strategies and goals; 
and it created new networks.  
PRECONDITIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION 
The preconditions of CSO participation are evaluated by drawing on three indicators: 
access, transparency and inclusion. These are necessary preconditions for democratic 
and legitimate decision-making. Stakeholders may only voice their arguments with in-
stitutionalised access to the deliberative settings. Transparency is crucial in order to 
provide CSOs with the necessary information so that they can participate meaningfully 
in the negotiations and so that the decision-making processes are exposed to public 
scrutiny. This is guaranteed by the disclosure of policy documents as well as the possi-
bilities of accessing information on the background of the WSIS. Inclusiveness ensures 
that arguments of all stakeholders that are possibly affected are included in the policy 
process. This can be achieved with the support of marginalised stakeholder groups, tak-
ing part in the negotiations through institutional settings such as scholarships.  
Access to deliberation  
Broad and active participation of all stakeholders was a defining and legitimising aspect 
of the WSIS. However, as a primarily intergovernmental summit, there were formal 
restrictions for CSOs and other observers when accessing the negotiations. In the course 
of the preparatory process, though, the formal rules disintegrated and access for CSOs 
to the deliberations improved.  
Except for CSOs that are in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), the other CSOs needed to accredit themselves at least six weeks 
before each PrepCom and more than four months before the summit. The application 
process demanded detailed information on the organisation, which is used by the Execu-
tive Secretariat, with the assistance of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service 
(NGLS), to decide upon the relevance and expertise of the CSOs willing to participate. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 43) 
- 10 - 
The emanating list of recommended observers was then distributed to the Member 
States which could request more information and delay or overturn the accreditation 
process. Since some states, notably China and Pakistan, tried to block civil society par-
ticipation, NGOs that had no legal status in the states of their origin were not accredited, 
as was the case with Human Rights China (EPIC 2004: 196). 
Once accredited, civil society actors were able to take part in the preparatory process 
and the summit within the scope of the Rules of Procedure and the Arrangements for 
Participation. The Rules of Procedure did not allow exceptionally far-reaching partici-
pation for non-governmental actors: 
“1. Non-governmental organizations, civil society and business sector entities 
accredited to participate in the Summit may designate representatives to sit as 
observers at public meetings of the Summit and its committees. 
2. Upon the invitation of the presiding officer of the body concerned and subject 
to the approval of that body, such observers may make oral statements on ques-
tions in which they have special competence” (WSIS 12.09.2003).  
Observers were allowed to take part in the plenary meetings, but not in the meetings of 
the governmental Bureau, the subcommittees and the working groups. They had no vot-
ing rights in public meetings. This handling of civil society participation is rather con-
servative in that it resembles the rules that are enforced at other high level world sum-
mits (see ECOSOC 19.03.2001: rule 64; UN 27.02.2002: rule 64). 
In practice, the rules on civil society participation at the WSIS were constantly dis-
cussed and interpreted during the preparatory process. Informally, CSOs were able to 
gain more participation rights than those that were officially provided.  
Especially since the Intersessional Meeting in Paris in July 2003 observers were in-
creasingly accepted to take part in the working groups and subcommittees. At the end of 
the Intersessional Meeting, the governmental WSIS Bureau officially consulted the 
Civil Society Bureau (CSB) and the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors 
(CCBI) for the first time in order to exchange views on the multi-stakeholder proce-
dures (Kleinwächter 2004b: 55). Kleinwächter (2004b) argues that this disintegration of 
the Rules of Procedure in favour of civil society participation was triggered by practical 
constraints. Governmental representatives were simply swamped with the discussions 
about technical details, for example on Internet governance. Some CSO representatives 
were helpful experts that were able to explain the complex context of the questions at 
stake to the diplomats.  
The Working Group on Internet Governance was another example of the tug-of-war 
when it came to civil society participation. At PrepCom3 the non-governmental partici-
pants were first allowed to speak for five minutes at the beginning of the session. How-
ever, when CSO representatives started to directly report out of the conference room via 
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Internet, they were again excluded from the sessions. As a consequence, some diplo-
mats that opposed this decision briefed civil society actors outside the negotiation 
rooms on the discussions that were going on inside (Kleinwächter 2004b: 61-62).  
CSO representatives as well as business actors were, in parts, also accepted as mem-
bers of national delegations. The decision to include them within the national delega-
tions rested with the respective nations. Switzerland and Denmark were outstanding in 
this respect; they included civil society and business advisors from an early stage on.13 
Germany started to include two non-state actors out of six national delegates at the in-
tersessional meeting in Paris.  
As an informal part of the preparatory process, eight multi-stakeholder roundtables 
were organised to specific themes around the topic “An Information Society for All: 
Opportunities and Challenges”.14 These talks took place at the beginning of PrepCom2 
and all stakeholders, including civil society, were invited to a free exchange of ideas 
with government representatives. The outcome was a Chairman’s summary of the dis-
cussion.15 However, these roundtables seemed to have had little influence on the work-
ing documents. Furthermore, the practice with regard to the selection of civil society 
speakers by the Secretariat was criticised as being quite arbitrary (Ó Siochrú 2004). 
In sum, CSOs had access to the negotiations; they could speak in meetings and sub-
mit their own documentation. Although their right to actively participate at the working 
level was restricted by formal rules, civil society actors have de facto been increasingly 
able to access most of the deliberations. Therefore one major precondition for democ-
ratic and legitimate decision-making was fulfilled by the WSIS process. 
Transparency – Access to documentation 
The policy process and background of the WSIS is comprehensively documented. All 
documents are available on the website of the world summit16: official documents, 
working documents, non-papers17, administrative documents and contributions by the 
different stakeholders. Additionally, statements, speeches and presentations of the di-
verse sessions are offered on the website. The meetings since PrepCom2 and the WSIS 
                                                 
13  For example, Denmark’s delegation included Rikke Frank Jorgensen from the Danish Institute for Human Rights 
as an advisor. Switzerland’s delegation at PrepCom2: http://www.itu.int/wsis/participation/prepcom2/ 
cty_results.asp?CountryID=SUI&B1=++Submit++ (last access 15.02.2006). 
14  http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/roundtables/index.html (last access 15.02.2006). 
15  WSIS, Arrangements for participation adopted at the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Geneva, 1-5 
July 2002), WSIS/PC-1/DOC/0011(annex2). 
16  www.itu.int/wsis (last access 15.02.2006).  
17  A non-paper is an unofficial presentation of government policy.  
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2003 have also been taped by the ITU’s Internet Broadcasting Service. Civil society on 
its part distributed the information via a plethora of mailing lists and own websites.  
Background information is offered through press releases and summaries of ‘daily 
highlights’ of the WSIS process. The ITU website provides external links that - in a 
wider sense - deal with the world summit, its goal of using information and communica-
tion technology for development and with WSIS related events.  
In the intersessional period between PrepCom2 and PrepCom3, the ITU put addi-
tional effort into giving an overview on governments and observers positions on the 
working documents. Working documents have been released with an additional section 
comprising ‘Observers contributions’ (WSIS 21.03.2003a; WSIS 21.03.2003b). This 
enhanced transparency; however, it also provoked critique with regard to the seemingly 
arbitrary selection of non-state actors input (CPSR 31.05.2003).  
The Reference Document (ITU 12.06.2003) was another endeavour by the ITU to 
compile contributions by both governments and observers to the Declaration of Princi-
ples and the Action Plan. Since the Reference Document ended up being very volumi-
nous, an additional Reading Guide (ITU 02.07.2003) was produced as a summarising 
version of the divergent views of the different stakeholders.  
Despite these efforts critique was voiced by civil society with regard to access to 
documentation. The brevity between the release of some documents for the broader 
public and the deadline to submit statements on those documents was criticised. One 
case in point is the non-paper that the president of the preparatory process, Adama 
Samassékou, produced informally prior to PrepCom3a. Sally Burch, who was responsi-
ble for the aggregation and drafting of civil society statements, described the problem as 
follows: 
“We appreciate Mr. Samassékou’s concern to receive our input, but in the cir-
cumstances (we all have full-time jobs elsewhere) it is almost impossible to or-
ganise a reaction at such a short notice, much less to make a proper on-line 
consultation, which means that whole regions (such as Latin America) are left 
out of the opportunity to react.”18   
Another point of critique was the lack of translation into languages other than English. 
Again, the above mentioned non-paper is a case in point. It was translated into French, 
but not into Spanish, which led, considering the tight time-frame, to the exclusion of 
Latin American civil society groups.  
Nevertheless, despite these deficiencies, the WSIS was a well documented event. 
Everybody was able to receive policy documents in order to make informed choices 
                                                 
18  Burch, Sally, 30.10.2003, “Report-back to the bureau on Samassékou’s non-paper”, <WSIS-CT>, 
http://mailman.greennet.org.uk/public/ct/2003-October/000802.html (last access 15.02.2006). 
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about the policy proposals. Additionally, background documents were widely accessible 
for more information on the issues at stake.  
Inclusion 
Another requirement for legitimate decision-making to take place is that all stakeholder 
groups that are affected by a policy decision should have a say in its formulation (Kaul 
2003: 28; Nanz and Steffek 2005). As there are potentially marginalised groups that 
face barriers for participation, the decision-making institution should ideally take spe-
cial measures to include these voices. Civil society organisations face barriers to par-
ticipation due to the lack of personnel and financial resources. Within civil society, cer-
tain specific groups are very likely to be underrepresented; for example: indigenous 
peoples, women, disabled persons and citizens of developing countries (on the last 
group see: Panos 2002). And yet, precisely those groups have a prominent interest in the 
issues that were being discussed at the WSIS as they are most affected by the digital 
divide19. Hence, these stakeholders are less likely to take part in the Information Society 
as envisioned at the WSIS and, at the same time, they face multiple barriers when it 
comes to participating in policy making on information and communication technolo-
gies – a vicious circle. 
As a matter of fact, civil society actors from developing countries were underrepre-
sented at the WSIS summit in Geneva and the PrepComs; the majority of civil society 
actors came from Europe (Dany 2005).  Moreover, women were underrepresented at the 
WSIS. Within civil society, females represented only a third of all CSO participants.  
Sreberny (2004: 197) consequentially criticises “the gap between the expressed inten-
tions around gender equality and the actual embodied speakers or writers who are over-
whelmingly male”. It can be inferred from this unbalanced representation that certain 
voices are likely to be excluded, although it is of course possible that male speakers or 
representatives from Northern CSOs raise issues pertaining to developing countries or 
women. Still, Eurocentrism and the slight gender inequality of civil society involved in 
the WSIS raises questions about the legitimacy of civil society itself which seems to 
exclude certain voices. An important contribution to the further evaluation of CSO par-
ticipation at the WSIS would be an analysis of the composition of civil society actors in 
order to infer to the legitimacy of this political actor.  
Therefore, it would have been a necessary requirement for a legitimate decision-
making process that the organisers of the WSIS had taken measures to include margin-
                                                 
19  The term digital divide describes the unequal distribution of ICT worldwide and the undesirable consequences for 
persons that are excluded from the benefits that information technologies provide. It is assumed that their connec-
tion, especially to the Internet, could be a valuable step towards economic, social and democratic development 
(Norris 2001). This challenge was the reason for conducting a World Summit on the Information Society.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 43) 
- 14 - 
alised civil society actors. The ITU, though, did not thoroughly abolish barriers to par-
ticipation for marginalised groups. Most meetings of the preparatory phase and the 
summit were held in Europe, the only exceptions being the regional conferences, one of 
which was held on each continent. This led to high travel expenses, which as an exam-
ple hindered delegations from developing country civil society groups to participate as 
they usually do not have large financial resources at their disposal. Effective participa-
tion of small delegations, mostly a feature of Civil society organisations from develop-
ing countries as well, was additionally inhibited by simultaneously scheduled events, 
which could not all be attended (Brazil 07.01.2003: 2). However, the ITU granted a re-
stricted number of fellowships for participants at the PrepComs and the summit. This 
was one measure to include the marginalised, these especially being individuals from 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) as well as women.   
In brief, fellowships were the only arrangement made to safeguard inclusion at the 
WSIS, particularly when it came to the two groups just mentioned. Barriers to participa-
tion for small and resource-poor delegations existed. These included the venue of the 
conferences and the amount of parallel events. Possibly and as a consequence, develop-
ing country and female civil society delegates were underrepresented. To sum up, the 
ITU did not provide sufficient measures beyond fellowships in order to include particu-
larly marginalised groups of civil society.   
RESPONSIVENESS TOWARDS CSO ARGUMENTS 
The multi-stakeholder approach, however, is not accomplished by merely providing 
preconditions for civil society participation, but also by granting a real opportunity to 
shape the policy output. Thus, in assessing the democratic quality of the WSIS, just as 
CSOs should be able to participate and provide input for the negotiations, it is just as 
crucial that they have an impact on the deliberations and the documents. Input in UN 
processes, though, does not automatically lead to impact and, indeed, it often doesn’t: 
“many in civil society are becoming frustrated; they can speak in the United Nations but 
feel they are not heard and their participation has little impact on outcomes” (United 
Nations 2004: 7). Civil society impact can be measured by looking at the degree to 
which governmental negotiators responded to the claims and arguments of CSO and 
how their voice was reflected in the documents. Along with the three preconditions for 
civil society impact – access, transparency, and inclusion – responsiveness is important 
in order to assess the democratic quality of the WSIS.  
In the WSIS context, responsiveness towards CSO demands developed to be one, if 
not the, major benchmark for the success of the summit. For the lack of progress in sub-
stance, the realisation of the multi-stakeholder-approach gained a legitimising function. 
Despite these high demands of the summit, many CSO representatives felt frustrated 
about their marginal influence. Finally, civil society actors backed out of the drafting 
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process after PrepCom3a in November 2003. They developed their own Declaration 
“Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs” (WSIS 08.12.2003) instead of en-
dorsing the official WSIS Declaration and Action Plan. To see whether the objections 
voiced by civil society referring to their marginal influence prove true, the responsive-
ness of the WSIS process is analysed in the following with regard to the discussions 
about Internet governance, intellectual property rights and communication rights.   
Content Analysis – Assessing the Responsiveness of the WSIS 
The responsiveness of the negotiations leading to the WSIS is assessed by using content 
analytical methods. The goal is to trace the argumentative input of CSOs in the evolu-
tion of the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action in order to assess the degree 
to which civil society actors were able to influence the policy outcome. The draft work-
ing documents in their variations over time as well as all written CSO input in the nego-
tiations during the preparatory process leading to WSIS 2003 with regard to specific 
issues serve as the unit of analysis.  
The study focuses on key issues in the negotiation process. Some of the most con-
tested issues at WSIS were Internet governance, intellectual property rights (IPR) and 
communication rights. The issue-selection is based on their centrality in the course of 
the WSIS. The topics have been chosen as these were the ones heavily discussed and 
civil society actors gave considerable input into the debate. 20  
In the analysis, only documents at certain points in time are taken into consideration. 
The starting point of the negotiations about content – as opposed to procedure – was the 
second preparatory conference (PrepCom2). Here, CSOs gave a substantial argumenta-
tive input into the meeting. Only then can one speak of a deliberative process. Therefore 
the initial documents that were released at the beginning of PrepCom2 will be the point 
of origin of the analysis. The final Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action, as 
they were presented at the WSIS summit in December 2003, are treated as the end 
point. In between, the discursive process is divided into six phases and only the most 
important fractures or milestones in the development of the working documents serve as 
points of reference in order to assess whether the CSO input – which is constantly and 
comprehensively observed – made any difference.  
The content analysis is accomplished in three steps: First, the background of the 
above mentioned issue areas are presented and key questions or categories of the issue 
are identified in order to guide the content analysis. To illustrate this procedure, the dis-
cussion about the generic issue communication right focused on three key questions:  
                                                 
20  To find an agreement on financial mechanisms to bridge the digital divide was another crucial and contested issue 
which nearly led to the failure of the whole WSIS process. However, this issue is not analysed here as CSOs did 
not give a sufficient amount of identifiable input into the debate.  
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(1) Promotion or neglect of communication rights or a right to communicate;  
(2) definition of communication rights or a right to communicate;  
(3) connection of those rights to the general human rights framework.  
 
Only statements by the different actors related to these questions have been taken into 
consideration. 
Second, the argumentative input of the CSOs is identified with regard to the core 
questions of the issue areas in the course of time. On the basis of all written statements 
by civil society organisations that have been accessible to the negotiators during the 
preparatory process, their main positions with the respective arguments and justifica-
tions are recognised. Altogether 111 civil society documents have been analysed in this 
way. Thus, one is able to develop the content of CSO demands and the corresponding 
justifications: how the issue is conceived, reasons for the positions, and the solutions 
proposed. Additionally, one can discover the salience of arguments and the degree of 
contention of the CSO positions with regard to the specific issues. The CSO input has 
been very diverse. It consisted of elaborated background papers, of short statements, 
pointed speeches or concrete drafting proposals for specific paragraphs. All of the input 
was taken into consideration and was treated equally in the content analysis. 
Third, the CSO arguments are traced in the evolving working documents, the Decla-
ration of Principles and the Action Plan in their respective provisional state of formula-
tion. 15 different versions of those documents have been taken into consideration.21 The 
drafting process is reconstructed in order to identify changes in the wordings, which 
may or may not relate to CSO input. As a result, one can assess whether the changes 
made in the working documents over time correspond to CSO demands or drafting pro-
posals. CSO demands that never made their way into the documents or vanished from 
the wordings at some point of the preparatory process were also taken into account.  
To round off the picture, positions of key governmental actors to the analysed issues 
were also considered in order to identify cases in which governmental actors internal-
ised CSO arguments or when they took a differing stance towards CSO positions. Fur-
thermore, background information derived from experiences of involved stakeholders 
was another means with which to guide the content analysis. Several detailed reports 
                                                 
21  The ‘Green Paper’, usually a written statement of the proposed policy on a particular issue which is put forward 
for discussion, served as the starting point for the analysis (t0), which is a compilation of the outcomes of the re-
gional conferences of 24.02.2003, and the Non-paper of 19.02.2003. Additionally, the following documents were 
analysed: Draft Declaration, 25.02.2003 and Draft Action Plan, 27.02.2003 (t1); D 21.03.2003, AP 21.03.2003 
(t2); D 18.07.2003, AP 22.08.2003 (t3); D 26.09.2003, AP 26.09.2003 (t4); Non-Paper 05.11.2003 (t5); D 
14.11.2003, AP 14.11.2003 (t6); D 12.12.2003, AP 12.12.2003 (t7).  
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Table 2:  Example of an adjustment to CSO demands: A section of the table “Internet 
governance”, period t5 – t6 (PrepCom3a – WSIS) 
t5 initial CSO input t6 output 
Draft Declaration, 14.11.2003, 
24 h 
45. The management of the 
Internet encompasses both tech-
nical and policy issues. The 
private sector has had and 
should continue to have an im-
portant role in the development 
of the Internet [at the technical 
level]. 
Alternative 45. [The manage-
ment of the Internet encom-
passes both technical and public 
policy issues. The private sector 
has had an important role in the 
development of the Internet. The 
private sector should continue to 
play an important role at the 
technical and commercial lev-
els.] 
46. Policy authority for Internet-
related public policy issues 
should be the sovereign right of 
countries. 
47. [Internet issues of an inter-
national nature related to public 
policies should be coordinated. 
Alternatives:  
a) between governments and 
other interested parties.  
b) Through/by appropriate inter-
governmental organizations 
under the UN framework.  
c) as appropriate on an intergov-
ernmental basis.  
d) through/by appropriate inter-
national organizations.  
e) through appropriate and mu-
tually agreed international or-
ganizations.  
Civil Society, Essential Bench-
marks for WSIS, 14.11.2003 
No single body and no single 
stakeholder group is able to 
manage all of the issues alone. 
Many stakeholders, cooperating 
in strict accordance with widely 
supported rules and procedures, 
must define the global agenda. 
The non-government sector has 
played a historically critical role 
in Internet Governance, and it 
must be recognized. The 
strength of the Internet as an 
open non-government platform 
should be reinforced, with an 
explicit stronger role for civil 
society. The role of governments 
should be no greater than that of 
any other stakeholder group. 
Civil Society Comment on Non-
Paper, 24.10.2003 
We consider it unacceptable that 
none of the options mentions the 
involvement of Civil Society. Of 
the five available options we 
would prefer a). 
WSIS Declaration, 12.12.2003 
49. The management of the 
Internet encompasses both tech-
nical and public policy issues 
and should involve all stake-
holders and relevant intergov-
ernmental and international 
organizations. In this respect it 
is recognized that: 
a) Policy authority for Internet-
related public policy issues is 
the sovereign right of States. 
They have rights and responsi-
bilities for international Internet-
related public policy issues; 
b) The private sector has had 
and should continue to have an 
important role in the develop-
ment of the Internet, both in the 
technical and economic fields; 
c) Civil Society has also played 
an important role on Internet 
matters, especially at commu-
nity level, and should continue 
to play such a role; 
d) Intergovernmental organiza-
tions have had and should con-
tinue to have a facilitating role 
in the coordination of Internet-
related public policy issues; 
e) International organizations 
have also had and should con-
tinue to have an important role 
in the development of Internet-
related technical standards and 
relevant policies. 
 
and edited volumes gave first-hand accounts from different angles on the negotiation 
process, its topics, and the role of civil society. These are mostly written by scholars and 
policy makers that participated at the WSIS, and were in parts released shortly after the 
first summit in 2003 (Calabrese and Padovani 2004; Kleinwächter 2004a; Kleinwächter 
2004b; Lavoie and Leuprecht 2005; Raboy and Landry 2005; Stauffacher and Klein-
wächter 2005; Servaes and Carpentier 2006). Press releases, websites and mailing-lists 
also give an account of what happened from the view of the participants. Additionally, 
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the author conducted interviews with civil society representatives that have been cen-
trally involved in lobbying for the analysed issues and were consulted directly.22 These 
diverse reports allowed an insight into the informal negotiation process that is not re-
flected in the documents, and to focus the analysis on the most important paragraphs, 
key categories of the issues and turning points.  
As a result of the content analysis the adjustment of the working documents towards 
CSO demands can be assessed. CSO impact can easily be detected when central de-
mands by CSOs are taken up into the working documents. It is at its highest level when 
the final documents adopted at the WSIS still feature these demands. No adjustment of 
policy documents vis-à-vis central demands of CSOs would be clear evidence for a lack 
of responsiveness of the WSIS negotiation process. To concretise the results of the con-
tent analysis, the salience and character of the CSO input that eventually was absorbed 
was taken into account. Assuming that CSOs were able to only shape the working 
documents with regard to less salient claims and negligible issues, this influence could 
not be counted as a real discursive success. 
In the following, the background of each issue is presented before key categories or 
central questions are identified that guided the content analysis. For each topic the 
analysis is undertaken as to what the different actors (non-state vs. state actors) are de-
manding with regard to the respective key categories or questions. In doing so, the evo-
lution of the CSO arguments and the development of the arguments in the working 
documents with regard to the respective issues can be systematically retraced. 
Internet governance 
‘Internet governance’ is a contested term; at the WSIS it was mainly used to describe 
the global political governance of the technical core resources of the Internet: domain 
names, IP addresses, internet protocols and the root server system. This corresponds to a 
narrow definition of Internet governance, whereas others argue that the term encom-
passes much more. A broad definition of Internet governance would also include rules 
                                                 
22  Conversational partners were, for example, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Kleinwächter,  Professor for International Com-
munication Policy at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and William J. Drake, President of Computer Profes-
sionals for Social Responsibility, both members of the Board of the Working Group of Internet Governance (on 
Internet governance); Rikke Frank Joergensen, Danish Human Rights Institute, chair of the Human Rights Cau-
cus at the WSIS and delegate of the national delegation of Denmark as civil society advisor (On Human 
Rights/Communication Rights); Dr. Francis Muguet, chair of the CS Working Group on Scientific Information at 
WSIS, Co-Chair of the CS Working Group on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks (on intellectual property 
rights). The talks were conducted at the 7th UN ICT Task Force Meeting in Berlin, 18.-20.11.2004 and the Con-
ference “Multistakeholder Approach in ICT Policy” which took place in Venice on 22.-23.11.2004. 
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and procedures dealing with – among other things – intellectual property, privacy, 
spam, cultural and linguistic diversity or consumer protection (Drake 2004: 6-7).  
The core question dealt with at WSIS was: Who should govern the Internet? 
(Kleinwächter 2004a: 233) One can identify key advocates for different alternatives23: 
The USA and the EU favoured private regulation of the Internet, meaning the existing 
system with a reformed Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) as the leading regulatory body; China and other developing countries such as 
South Africa and Brazil would have liked to see the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) in charge, thus favouring multilateral governmental leadership; business 
actors opposed any governmental influence on the Internet and argued for self-
regulation; whereas civil society promoted decentralisation of responsibility.  
Up to now, ICANN has been responsible for the allocation of technical resources of 
the Internet, namely Internet identifiers and the root server system. It is a private non-
profit organisation which was established in California in 1998 and has a limited techni-
cal mandate. Its proponents highlight its bottom-up governance mechanism and the ad-
vantage of a non-governmental organisation regulating the technical aspects of the 
Internet: whilst at the same time assuring that it can develop openly and in an unregu-
lated manner. Therefore there are voices from within the Internet community that the 
established governance system should not be altered: “If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it” or 
“First, do no harm”, as one of the founding fathers of the Internet noted (Cerf 2004). 
Its opponents criticise ICANN for being US-dominated. The US Department of 
Commerce did indeed facilitate the assignment of the responsibility for the management 
of Internet Names and Addresses to ICANN through a Memorandum of Understanding 
in 1998. Both parties agreed to collaborate on a common Domain Name System project 
to design, develop and test mechanisms, methods and procedures for Internet govern-
ance through ICANN.24 The USA just extended the Memorandum of Understanding 
between its Department of Commerce and ICANN until 2006 while PrepCom2 was 
taking place in Geneva in 2003.  
ICANN is also criticised for its focus on technical issues. Since the 1990s it has been 
increasingly recognised that the regulation of the Internet is also a political issue. With 
the Internet becoming a substantial economic factor and a mainstream medium, prob-
lems such as the distribution of the dotcom domains or cross-border jurisdictional ten-
                                                 
23  See Greve, Georg, Debriefing on WSIS, Intersessional Meeting Paris, July 15-18, 
http://www.germany.fsfeurope.org/projects/wsis/debriefing-paris.de.html (last access 15.02.2006). 
24  Memorandum of Understanding between the US Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (1998): http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm 
(last access 15.02.2006). 
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sions evolved, e.g. disagreements on how to deal with hate speech and pornography. 
Developments like the burst of the “dotcom bubble” and the terrorist attacks of 11th 
September 2001 further challenged the private - and merely technical - governance of 
the Internet. It was recognised that “government participation in regulating the Internet 
is necessary” (Baird 2002: 16). The question remains, whether it is enough to reform 
ICANN and strengthen governmental participation in its framework, or if an intergov-
ernmental approach is needed.  
An intergovernmental approach to Internet governance promotes the ITU or another 
intergovernmental organisation under UN auspices as the governance body. It should 
not only deal with technical aspects but also with other Internet-related issues, such as 
spam and illegal content. Developing countries, which feel underrepresented in ICANN, 
expect a more balanced regulation of the Internet from the ITU (Drake 2004: 9). China 
was a key player in this respect, supported by members of the G20 like Brazil, South 
Africa and India. The government of Brazil not only demanded a multilateral organisa-
tion in charge of Internet governance, meaning the ITU, but also asked for a stronger 
representation of developing countries (Brazil 31.05.2003: 10). 
These demands led to a sharp divergence between developing and developed coun-
tries, the private sector and civil society. Fears of a “UN takeover” of the Internet were 
voiced by some countries, the business community and civil society actors. There was 
the fear that authoritarian governments could seek control over the Internet, that the UN 
would dominate the Internet for its own ends, that UN decision-making would be anti-
American and controlled by corrupt bureaucracies and that fundamental changes of the 
Internet could only be for the worse (Drake 2004: 10-11).  
As a third alternative besides a leadership of either ICANN or the ITU, a decentral-
ised approach was proposed mainly by civil society, as will be shown in the following.  
Civil Society Argumentative Input  
Civil society gave a considerable and relatively consistent input for the negotiations 
about Internet governance during the preparatory process. It focused on how the Internet 
should be governed – that is participative, transparent, inclusive and accountable – and 
who should be in charge. The priority issue has been that decentralised governance 
mechanisms should be employed and that all stakeholders should be included in the 
governance of the Internet. Consensually it was demanded that the civil society sector 
should play a stronger role in Internet governance. Policies and frameworks should be 
developed in a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach.  
“No single body and no single stakeholder group is able to manage all of the is-
sues alone. Many stakeholders, cooperating in strict accordance with widely 
supported rules and procedures, must define the global agenda. The non-
government sector has played a historically critical role in Internet Governance, 
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and it must be recognized. The strength of the Internet as an open non-
government platform should be reinforced, with an explicit stronger role for 
Civil Society. The role of Governments should be no greater than that of any 
other stakeholder group” (Civil Society Content and Themes Group 
14.11.2003).   
ICANN was backed as a suitable organisation to fulfil the task of governing the Inter-
net, although reforms were demanded in order to make the private not-for-profit organi-
sation more transparent and accountable to the public. At the same time a limitation of 
its mission was proposed (APC 31.05.2003). In a longer view, others demanded that the 
responsibility of Internet governance should be handed over to the Internet community 
(Internet Governance Caucus 16.07.2003; 18.07.2003). The Japanese Centre for Global 
Communications even argued that the Internet cannot be governed at all. They rejected 
the term Internet governance and demanded that the existing system should not be 
changed as long as it works (GLOCOM 30.05.2003). A case was also made for facilitat-
ing the participation of developing countries in global coordination meetings dealing 
with global Internet resources and policies (Internet Governance Caucus 18.07.2003).  
These main strands of argumentation should not conceal that there have been differ-
ent conceptions about Internet governance within civil society (Peake 2004: 4). The 
finally agreed upon Civil Society Declaration demands that 
 “…when the conditions for system stability and sound management can be 
guaranteed, authority over inherently global resources like the root servers 
should be transferred to a global multistakeholder entity” (WSIS 08.12.2003).   
Besides this major discussion about who should govern the Internet, some minor points 
have been raised as well, concentrating more on what Internet governance should deal 
with. Here the implementation and deployment of multilingual top level domains was 
mentioned, in order to enable local communications and reflect linguistic diversity 
(Internet Governance Caucus 16.07.2003). It was also demanded that Internet govern-
ance should focus on developing and securing global information commons as well as a 
right of universal access. References to the public interest were made: “the management 
of the core resources of the Internet (…) must serve the public interest at the global, 
national and local level” (German Civil Society 28.08.2003).  
In conclusion, civil society agreed that the governance of the Internet should be de-
centralised, including all relevant stakeholders. In particular, a stronger role for civil 
society was demanded as well as more participation of developing countries in Internet 
governance. Civil Society did not agree on who should be in charge of Internet govern-
ance. Mainly, though, ICANN was proposed as a suitable organisation for that task, 
provided that it undergoes significant reforms. Others stressed the need that the govern-
ance of the Internet should be handed over to the Internet community. Altogether, CSOs 
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declined strong governmental supervision over Internet governance. The final Civil So-
ciety Declaration rather vaguely promoted a global multi-stakeholder entity as regula-
tory mechanism.  
Tracing CSO Input in the Drafting Process on Internet Governance 
Internet governance was one of the most controversial issues at the WSIS and, in the 
end, governments could only agree to disagree. The issue was postponed and UN Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan was asked to set up a Working Group on Internet Governance 
(WGIG) “to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the govern-
ance of the Internet by 2005” (WSIS 12.12.2003b: section 13b).25   
WSIS Plan of Action, 12.12.2003 
13. b We ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up a working group on Internet govern-
ance, in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active participation of 
governments, the private sector, and civil society from both developing and developed countries, involv-
ing relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and forums, to investigate and make 
proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005. The group should, inter alia: 
i) develop a working definition of Internet governance; 
ii) identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance; 
iii) develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments, existing 
intergovernmental and international organizations and other forums as well as the private sector and 
civil society from both developing and developed countries. 
iv) prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for consideration and appropriate ac-
tion for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005. 
WSIS Declaration of Principles, 12.12.2003 
48. The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public and its governance should con-
stitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. The international management of the Internet 
should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private 
sector, civil society and international organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of re-
sources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the Internet, taking into 
account multilingualism.  
49. The management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should 
involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international organisations. In this respect it 
is recognized that: 
a) Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have 
rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues; 
b) The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the development of the 
Internet, both in the technical and economic fields; 
c) Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and 
should continue to play such a role; 
d) Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating role in the devel-
opment of Internet-related public policy issues; 
e) International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the devel-
opment of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.  
                                                 
25  The WGIG has been established by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, on 11 November 2004.  
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At the outset of the WSIS process, Internet governance was not at all a strongly debated 
issue. It only became one ever since PrepCom2 took place. In the end, it was the most 
contested issue of the WSIS, and it remained so all the way through the second phase 
leading to Tunis 2005. The reasons for this can be found in the salience of Internet gov-
ernance; the discussions and negotiations were undertaken outside of the WSIS. The 
ITU held a Plenipotentiary Conference in Marrakech parallel to the regional WSIS 
meetings and at this occasion a heated debate about the future role of the ITU in Internet 
governance began and was transfused into the WSIS context (Kleinwächter 2004a: 241-
242).  
The term Internet governance was first mentioned in the Bávaro Declaration in Janu-
ary 2002, the outcome of the Latin American WSIS Regional Ministerial Conference. 
However, the concept remained vague, merely stating that Internet governance should 
be multilateral, transparent and democratic and take into account the needs of the public 
and private sectors as well as those of civil society (Kleinwächter 2004a: 240f). The 
first substantial reflection of the Internet governance debate in WSIS documents is no-
ticeable in the Declaration of the Western Asia Conference in February 2003.  
“The responsibility for root directories and domain names should rest with a 
suitable international organization and should take multilingualism into consid-
eration. Countries’ top-level-domain-names and Internet Protocol (IP) address 
assignment should be the sovereign right of countries. The sovereignty of each 
nation should be protected and respected. Internet Governance should be multi-
lateral, democratic and transparent and should take into account the needs of 
the public and private sectors as well as those of civil society” [own accentua-
tion] (WSIS 06.02.2003: section 4).  
This paragraph nearly remained unaltered at PrepCom2, although a small albeit impor-
tant addition was made. The first sentence was supplemented as follows:  
“The responsibility for root directories and domain names should rest with a 
suitable international [intergovernmental] organization (…)” [own accentua-
tion] (WSIS 25.02.2003: section 58).   
The notion of an intergovernmental organisation as an additional option for a regulatory 
body can be interpreted as an adjustment towards the demands of developing countries, 
in this case led by China. With this parenthesis, the ITU was introduced as an alterna-
tive to ICANN leadership. This, though, did not adhere to the intention of CSOs, since 
they were in general opposed to more governmental control over the Internet.  
The Declaration (WSIS 18.07.2003: section 44) was then extended, offering three al-
ternatives. It recognised that the management of the Internet encompasses both technical 
and policy issues, and certifies the private sector (that is ICANN) and governments (that 
is ITU) respectively important roles. Alternatively, one of the above mentioned para-
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graphs also includes the importance of respecting multilingualism, whereas alternative 
two is more comprehensive: it makes references to the common good and a fair distri-
bution of resources; it demands access for all as well as a stable and secure functioning 
of the Internet; and it emphasises the need to respect the geographical diversity through 
the representation of actors involved in the regulatory body. These alternative para-
graphs reflect demands by CSOs. Although it can not be reconstructed whether those 
remarks originated within the demands by CSOs, this section nevertheless shows that 
governmental actors have been discussing issues that were raised by CSOs. The refer-
ences to multilingualism and a fair distribution of resources remained within the docu-
ments and were incorporated into the final version of the Declaration.  
After the Intersessional Meeting in Paris, the Action Plan (WSIS 22.08.2003: section 
29) mentioned the need for an international dialogue about the appropriate management 
structure of the Internet among all interested parties whose outcome should be reviewed 
in Tunis 2005. The stalemate between the differing governmental positions was not re-
solved by the time of the summit. 
During PrepCom3 in September 2003, an alternative paragraph listed different op-
tions about how Internet issues should be coordinated:  
“ a) between governments and other interested parties.  
 b) through/by appropriate intergovernmental organizations under the UN 
framework.  
 c)  as appropriate on an intergovernmental basis.  
 d)  through/by appropriate international organizations. 
 e)  through appropriate and mutually agreed international organizations” 
(WSIS 26.09.2003b: section 40).  
These alternatives have been included in the following non-paper, which was drafted in 
October and November 2003, against fierce opposition by CSOs. The civil society 
comments on the draft non-paper take on the following points: 
“We consider it unacceptable that none of the options mentions the involvement 
of Civil Society. Of the five available options we would prefer a)” (Civil Society 
Working Group on Content and Themes 30.10.2003).   
Finally, the official WSIS Declaration seemed to adapt to this critique and the demands 
put forward by civil society. In December, the roles of different stakeholders were made 
even more explicit, and now the importance of civil society is also mentioned: 
“Civil Society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially 
at community level, and should continue to play such a role” [own accentua-
tion] (WSIS 12.12.2003a: section 49c).   
Since the strengthening of their own role was a priority for the CSOs involvement in the 
Internet governance debate, this was an important success of civil society participation 
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in the process and an adjustment towards CSO demands. Nevertheless, the CSO role 
was still restricted to playing a role “especially at the community level”.  
The establishment of a Working Group on Internet governance (WGIG) also accords 
to CSO demands. This recognises positions of civil society as it is emphasised that the 
WGIG should be set up  
“in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and ac-
tive participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from both 
developing and developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and 
international organizations and forums (…)” (WSIS 12.12.2003a: section 50).   
Now, as the WGIG mechanisms have been established, first assessments of involved 
civil society members give a positive account with regard to the representation of dif-
ferent stakeholders, and the openness and transparency of the new body. Civil society 
and representatives from developing countries are adequately represented in this 
mechanism, which was established to find a compromise with regard to Internet gov-
ernance in the Tunis phase and beyond. Still, the WGIG was not established because of 
CSO demands; the main reason seems to have been the inability to agree on a satisfying 
solution and the stalemate between major countries on this issue. 26  
In conclusion, the documents were to some degree responsive towards CSOs with 
regard to the Internet governance debate. The final documents included a reference to 
the important role of civil society and proposed the establishment of a Working Group 
on Internet Governance (WGIG) in which different stakeholder groups should be 
equally represented. Although this outcome is in line with priority demands by CSOs, 
one has to be cautious with regard to the causal relationship between the CSO demand 
and its adoption into the WSIS Declaration. The negotiations on Internet governance 
have been mainly dominated by a stalemate between powerful states and none of the 
parties involved was willing to step back from its position during the process (Peake 
2004: 4). Together with their followers, the USA and China dominated the discourse to 
such a large degree that civil society was not able, as wasn’t any other stakeholder, to 
steer the discussions in their direction. It was the conflict between the powerful states 
that was responsible for the inability to agree on an institution to be in charge of Internet 
governance. This in turn led to the necessity of setting up the Working Group on Inter-
net Governance. Additionally, no concrete proposals of CSOs with regard to Internet 
Governance were adopted in the documents.  
                                                 
26  Interview with Wolfgang Kleinwächter, member of the Working Group on Internet Governance, on 19.11.2004. 
See also “WSIS Working Group on Internet Governance set up. Civil Society well represented, US Government 
not a member”, 13.11.2004, http://www.worldsummit2003.de/en/web/687.htm (last access 15.02.2006).  
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights serve as temporary monopolies on intellectual work. They 
are enforced by patents, copyrights and trademarks and are internationally governed by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994) and the Copyright Treaty of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO, 1996) (Sell 2002: 171). The political as well 
as academic debate about intellectual property rights deals with questions of ownership 
as well as the control of information and knowledge. Different conceptions about the 
adequacy of the existing regimes by the rights holders, the users of information and 
knowledge and indigenous peoples compete with each other.  
Those who benefit from the existing IPR regime are mainly creators and dissemina-
tors of information and knowledge; they were therefore the main proponents of IPR at 
the WSIS. Representatives of content producing countries, notably the United States, of 
the private sector and unions of authors and journalists, were convinced that the IPR 
system coordinated by WIPO and GATS should be maintained.  
“Existing international intellectual property agreements provide a valuable 
mechanism through which to protect intellectual investment and encourage the 
creation and dissemination of works. These agreements encompass and reflect a 
balance between the interests of owners and users of intellectual property.” 
(United States of America 30.05.2004)   
Knowledge is turned into property which in turn is protected by IPR. These rights se-
cure innovation and creativity to ultimately encourage trade and investment (Sell and 
Prakash 2004: 154). They serve as economic incentives for authors who would other-
wise not bother to produce intellectual work (May 2004: 408). Consumers of knowledge 
may take advantage of the principle of ‘fair use’, which guarantees that everybody can 
freely utilise information and knowledge for private, non-commercial purposes. From 
this perspective the existing rights are adequate and fair because they treat users’ rights 
and the needs of rights holders in a balanced way. The Internet and other developments 
in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are recognised as a threat to 
intellectual property. They allow everyone to receive, impart and store indefinite 
amounts of data. Therefore the WSIS was called upon not only to reaffirm the existing 
rules but to adapt and extend them to the requirements of digital media and software 
applications (CCBI 17.07.2003). 
Taking a different stance, opponents of intellectual property rights, for the most part 
developing countries and civil society organisations, question the intent and usefulness 
of existing IPR regimes (May 2004: 395). They are heavily criticised for being restric-
tive and discriminatory with regard to the users in general and developing countries in 
particular.  
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“TRIPS institutionalized a conception of intellectual property based on protec-
tion and exclusion rather than competition and diffusion. (…) The long-term re-
distributive implications of TRIPS are not yet fully understood. The short-term 
impact of intellectual property protection will undoubtedly be a significant 
transfer of resources from developing country consumers and firms to industri-
alized country firms” (Sell 2002: 172-173).   
Most developing countries demand free access to information and knowledge to further 
their economic development (May 2004: 412). Knowledge and information are under-
stood as global public goods (Kaul 1999; May 2004: 404), which should serve the pub-
lic interest and not exclusively economic ends. Free access to intellectual work does not 
hamper, but rather stimulates innovation and creativity, as it favours the development of 
new ideas and works. Therefore, IPR should be critically reviewed and changed if nec-
essary. Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) and Open Access were proposed as 
alternative solutions to loosen the existing IPR regime.  
Indigenous peoples take a middle position in the debate on IPR as they have excep-
tional interests to protect their traditional knowledge and benefit from its use.  
The debate at the WSIS therefore focused around three central issues: First, should 
the existing IPR regime be challenged in the WSIS context or should it be maintained 
and enforced? This implies the question of whether the WSIS should deal with issues of 
IPR at all or whether those questions can be answered more adequately in other interna-
tional fora such as the WIPO or the WTO. Second, what is the ideal regime design for 
regulating IPR in the information society? Third, the need for Free and Open Source 
Software (FOSS) and Open Access solutions was discussed. 
Civil Society Argumentative Input  
No uniform position of civil society on intellectual property rights can be detected. 
Three factions and their agendas are identifiable. The majority of CSOs wanted to chal-
lenge the existing rights regimes. Unions of content creators, publishers and distributors 
took a supportive stance towards IPR. Indigenous peoples demanded special protection 
of their traditional knowledge via IPR. 
To start with, the minority opinion within civil society - that of the unions of produc-
ers and publishers of information and knowledge - claimed that copyrights, patents and 
trademarks are necessary and adequate and should therefore be maintained. They argue 
that without IPR there would be no creativity or innovation. Content creators further 
demanded an expansion of intellectual property rights when considering the challenges 
of an increasingly digital environment. Essentially, their point of view resembled the 
demands of the private sector and leading industrialised countries.  
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Indigenous people’s perception of IPR also deviates from the main civil society posi-
tion. They feel discriminated by the existing IPR regime, but, in turn, object to the pub-
lic domain concept that is supported by numerous civil society organisations. Since 
many indigenous peoples are unaware of the existence of intellectual property rights or 
of the procedures of how to make use of them for their own purposes, a lot of traditional 
knowledge is not protected and the right to use and sell it has been claimed by compa-
nies in other countries. Products that derive from that knowledge are then resold to them 
for high prices. The incorporation of their knowledge into the public domain is not ac-
cepted as an adequate solution because it turns their knowledge into a freely available 
resource for commercial utilisation, thus once again making it vulnerable to non-
indigenous IPR regimes who would patent it (WSIS 2003: 4). Essentially, indigenous 
knowledge should be protected by special intellectual property rights. 
“Indigenous peoples, nations and tribes have the right to both fully explore ex-
isting legal regimes and to develop sui generis legal systems, in order to safe-
guard traditional knowledge and to ensure protection of sacred and/or secret 
content“ (Global Forum of Indigenous Peoples and the Information Society 
11.12.2003: sections 23 and 24).   
This position is not shared by the majority of CSOs, which declare that copyrights, pat-
ents and trademarks are per se not adequate to secure a fair balance between the rights 
holders and the users. The existing IPR regime should be altered to restore the balance 
in favour of the users and to create a public domain of information as knowledge “is an 
unlimited resource that grows and is enriched as it is shared” (Civil Society Drafting 
Committee 25.02.2003). Extensive advantages are presented in order to justify this posi-
tion:  
“Securing and extending Global commons is a major way of bridging the digital 
divide and of ensuring the minimal equitable conditions for the overall develop-
ment of intellectual creativity, technological innovation, effective technology use 
and successful participation in the information and communication society. 
These are the necessary pre-conditions for realizing the values and principles of 
Freedom, Equality, Solidarity and Shared responsibility adopted in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration” (Civil Society Coordination Group 
12.09.2002: 3-4).   
Especially people in developing countries would benefit from the unrestricted access to 
information and knowledge, which until now have been disadvantaged by IPR.  
“Copyright laws have been technology-driven and have tended to follow the de-
velopment of technologies pioneered by the developed world (…) This disadvan-
tages most African countries and developing countries by hindering the transfer 
and access to information and content development. Such laws should be re-
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viewed to address this concern as a priority” (Africa Civil Society Caucus 
31.05.2003).   
As alternatives to IPR, CSOs encourage the promotion of Free and Open Source Soft-
ware as well as Open Access. Free and Open Source Software is unanimously promoted 
by civil society as an alternative to proprietary software; for example software produced 
by Microsoft and Apple. FOSS is described as being cheaper, better and more secure 
than traditional software and it is furthermore adaptable to specific needs (Citizens' Un-
ion Paremvassi 26.05.2003). Hence it can be meaningfully deployed by those who are 
marginalised in the Information Society; for example developing countries. The devel-
opment and use of FOSS can lead to innovation and therefore may be able to stimulate 
economic growth (Asian NGOs 07.12.2002). In addition, the sustainability of FOSS is 
accentuated:  
“It provides a truly sustainable model for all areas of society, bringing back 
competition and furthering innovation for a prosperous and inclusive informa-
tion and knowledge society for all” (PCT Working Group 23.09.2003).   
To implement these ideas, governmental institutions, universities and schools should be 
early adopters of FOSS and this should be enforced by law (Consumers International 
31.05.2003; Korean Civil Society Network 31.05.2003), as governments’ use of pro-
prietary software is economically unsustainable, intransparent and insecure (Civil Soci-
ety Content and Themes Group 15.07.2003). Educational institutions could help to build 
capacity for using this software and teach the spirit of cooperation that is inherent in its 
application (PCT Working Group 16.07.2003).  
CSOs also call for Open Access to scientific information and knowledge. In general, 
Open Access is promoted for the same principle that was stated above: knowledge and 
information are public goods and should be free. In principle, all knowledge which has 
been publicly funded, such as scientific knowledge, belongs to the public sphere (PCT 
Working Group 30.10.2003). Additionally, scientific information is particularly valu-
able knowledge, which therefore should be deployed for development purposes (Third 
World Academy of Sciences 23.01.2003). The underlying problem is that many re-
searchers in developing countries, when compared to their colleagues in the industrial-
ised world, do not have the same possibilities when it comes to accessing journals and 
papers. This is mainly due to high costs and technological impediments. Scientific pub-
lications are the most expensive there where academic institutions have the fewest re-
sources to pay for them. And they are also the least accessible due to a lack of band-
width for downloading scientific papers, this occurring where they are most in need. 
CSOs therefore argue that scientific work should be distributed for free, for example via 
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Open Access Journals or Peer-to-peer technology27 (WSIS 21.03.2003a: Working Group 
on Scientific Information Contribution). This practice would be neither time- nor 
money-consuming as researchers in developed countries can simply use their computer 
equipment as a distributor (Working Group on Scientific Information 16.07.2003).  
In short, although there were different factions within civil society, each having its 
own interest in the IPR debate, the majority was demanding that the existing regimes be 
challenged. The public domain concept of information and knowledge was put forward 
as a way to alter the predominantly economic character of the existing IPR regimes. The 
promotion of Free and Open Source Software and Open Access to scientific information 
was a priority demand.   
Tracing CSO Input in the Drafting Process on Intellectual Property Rights 
The final working documents contain several references to intellectual property rights, 
Free and Open Source Software and Open Access. In the course of the negotiation proc-
ess the balance between the emphasis on the rights of IPR-holders and on the needs of 
the users changed in favour of the latter; hence, to some degree, it followed the demands 
made by CSOs.  
Only one month before the summit took place, the WSIS documents still described 
the importance and viability of the existing rights regime.  
“Intellectual property protection is essential to encourage the innovation and 
creativity in the Information Society. However, striking a fair balance between 
protection of intellectual property on the one hand, and its use, and knowledge 
sharing, on the other, is essential to the Information Society. This balance is re-
flected by protection and flexibilities included in existing Intellectual Property 
agreements, and should be maintained. Facilitating meaningful participation by 
all in intellectual property issues through awareness, capacity building and de-
velopment of legal framework is a fundamental part of an inclusive Information 
Society” (WSIS 05.11.2003: section 38).   
CSOs recommended that the whole text be deleted, using the justification that it “repre-
sents solely the interests of the rights-holding industry, not that of authors, recipients, 
indigenous people or society as a whole” (PCT Working Group 30.10.2003). The 
aforementioned text ignores the public domain concept (Civil Society Working Group 
                                                 
27  An example would be the eJDS programme, which disseminates individual scientific articles via e-mail to scien-
tists in institutions in those Third World Countries that do not have access to sufficient bandwidth to download 
material from the Internet in a timely manner or cannot afford the connection. www.ejds.org/ (Third World 
Academy, 23.01.2003) 
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on Content and Themes 30.10.2003). It seems as if the negotiators responded to this 
critique. 
In the Declaration that was released two weeks later, the criticised paragraph was 
parenthesised and provided with a footnote saying that “some delegations have indi-
cated that further consultations on the text are still needed” (WSIS 14.11.2003: section 
38). The WSIS Declaration finally changed the contested section into its present, final 
form.   
WSIS Declaration, 12.12.2003, section 42 
Intellectual Property protection is important to encourage innovation and creativity in the Information 
Society; similarly, the wide dissemination, diffusion, and sharing of knowledge is important to encourage 
innovation and creativity. Facilitating meaningful participation by all in intellectual property issues and 
knowledge sharing through full awareness and capacity building is a fundamental part of an inclusive 
Information Society.  
Two adjustments towards the mainstream CSO position can be found. First, the Decla-
ration acknowledges that not only IPR but similarly the sharing of information consti-
tutes a precondition for innovation and creativity. Second, the need to maintain the ex-
isting intellectual property rights regime is no longer mentioned.  
Indigenous people’s demands with respect to intellectual property rights are not re-
flected in the final versions of the Declaration and the Action Plan. Earlier in the nego-
tiation process they were under consideration, as can be seen in the Action Plan of 21 
March 2003, which mentions that a “protection against unfair use of indigenous knowl-
edge should be developed” (WSIS 21.03.2003a: section 34). This formulation was kept 
until the version of 22 August 2003 (WSIS 22.08.2003: section 30b). These ideas reflect 
the drafting proposals of indigenous people’s organisations and other CSOs supporting 
them, for example the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions 
which stated earlier that “we also fully endorse the need to achieve protection against 
the unfair use of indigenous knowledge” (IFLA 23.05.2003). Despite a more concrete 
input by the indigenous communities, no other reference to their concerns was made in 
the WSIS documents.  
The promotion of Free and Open Source Software was another priority issue of 
CSOs in the debate about an adequate IPR regime. During the whole drafting process 
this concern was reflected in the WSIS documents. A change of terminology and a dif-
fering emphasis on concrete proposals of how to implement FOSS could now be de-
tected. Some of these changes reflected demands made by CSOs, others didn’t. Overall, 
the negotiators were more responsive towards CSOs at an earlier stage in the negotia-
tion process than just before the summit.  
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WSIS Declaration, 12.12.2003, section 27  
Access to information and knowledge can be promoted by increasing awareness among all stakeholders 
of the possibilities offered by different software models, including proprietary, open-source and free soft-
ware, in order to increase competition, access by users, diversity of choice, and to enable all users to 
develop solutions which best meet their requirements. Affordable access to software should be considered 
as an important component of a truly inclusive Information Society.  
The Action Plan provided explicit proposals when it comes to achieving this goal: 
Action Plan, 12.12.2003, section 10 
e) Encourage research and promote awareness among all stakeholders of the possibilities offered by 
different software models, and the means of their creation, including proprietary, open-source and free 
software, in order to increase competition, freedom of choice and affordability, and to enable all stake-
holders to evaluate which solution best meets their requirements.  
 j) Support research and development of the design of useful instruments for all stakeholders to foster 
increased awareness, assessment, and evaluation of different software models and licenses, so as to en-
sure an optimal choice of appropriate software that will best contribute to achieving development goals 
within local conditions  
CSOs were able to influence the terminology of the documents - as in the case of the 
use of “Free and Open Source Software” instead of “Open Source Software” (Civil So-
ciety Content and Themes Subcommittee 18.07.2003). In other cases, however, they 
lost the ‘war’ of the words as the final Declaration contains the term “freedom of 
choice”, which was explicitly rejected by CSOs. The term “software models” can be 
seen as a compromise between the CSOs demand for “software paradigm” and the term 
“software application”. The Working Group on Patents, Copyright and Trademarks in-
terpreted the latter as an improper limitation to specific software programs (software 
application) instead of focusing on the overall political structure (software model or 
software paradigm) (PCT Working Group 30.10.2003). In the end, the compromising 
word ‘model’ was retained.  
If one follows the drafting process chronologically, the documents have been more 
adaptive to CSO demands with regard to FOSS at an earlier stage. Then, the documents 
described more concretely and in much more detail what kind of software should be 
promoted:  
“Open-source software, including UNESCO software CDS/ISIS, multiplatform 
and open platform as well as interoperability standards, should be used more 
broadly to provide freedom of choice and to facilitate access to ICTs by all citi-
zens, at an affordable cost.” (WSIS 21.03.2003a: section 14).   
In August the documents describe in detail how free and open source software can be 
spread, for example through awareness-raising, a “Programmers without Frontiers Ini-
tiative” or the creation of a collaborative network of open-source/free software technol-
ogy tools for civil society (WSIS 22.08.2003: section 17). And around PrepCom3, in 
September, open source strategies were expressively encouraged in the first sentence of 
the paragraph.  
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“The growth of an information society should be encouraged through the adop-
tion of open source strategies for software applications as they contribute to in-
crease access and enhance diversity for software users. Multiple software mod-
els exist which promotes the principle of technology neutrality, these include 
open source, free and proprietary software, and are valuable models that sup-
port more affordable access to ICTs” (WSIS 26.09.2003b: section 22).   
However, the non-paper issued in November 2003 was a step back from the perspective 
of CSO claims.  
“Access to information and knowledge can be promoted by increasing aware-
ness among all stakeholders of the possibilities offered by different software ap-
plications, including proprietary, open source and free software, in order to in-
crease competition, freedom of choice and affordability, and to enable all users 
to evaluate which solution meets their requirements” (WSIS 05.11.2003: section 
24).   
FOSS is once again reduced to a mere “software application” and the concrete proposals 
of the Action Plan on how to promote free and open source software somehow van-
ished. Later versions of the Action Plan were even more moderate and vaguer with re-
gard to FOSS. 
In conclusion, Free and Open Source software was an important issue in the negotia-
tions on IPR, which corresponds to the demands made by CSOs. Minor adjustments 
towards CSO demands concerning FOSS took place in relation to terminology. How-
ever, in the WSIS documents, FOSS was not explicitly promoted as an alternative to 
proprietary software but as one choice among many. Furthermore, the concrete propos-
als in the final Action Plan on how to promote FOSS are quite weak when compared to 
former versions of this document.  
The responsiveness of the WSIS documents with regard to CSO proposals on Open 
Access follows the same pattern. At an earlier stage of the negotiations, CSOs were able 
to place some important drafting proposals in the documents. Later on they vanished 
again, but the final versions were still influenced to some degree by CSO arguments. 
Open Access is encouraged and the Action Plan proposes concrete ways in order to im-
plement it.  
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Action Plan, 12.12.2003, sections 10 and 22 
10i) Encourage initiatives to facilitate access, including free and affordable access to open access jour-
nals and books, and open archives for scientific information.  
22b) Promote electronic publishing, differential pricing and open access initiatives to make scientific 
information affordable and accessible in all countries on an equitable basis.  
22c) Promote the use of peer-to-peer technology to share scientific knowledge and pre-prints and reprints 
written by scientific authors who have waived their right to payment.  
WSIS Declaration, 12.12.2003, section 28  
We strive to promote universal access with equal opportunities for all to scientific knowledge and the 
creation and dissemination of scientific and technical information, including open access initiatives for 
scientific publishing.   
During the Intersessional Meeting in July 2003, the concept of Open Access was in-
cluded in the documents. The Declaration (WSIS 18.07.2003: sections 21-22) stated 
that the promotion of Open Access can, among other things, help to remove barriers so 
that equitable access to information for education, scientific, economic, social, political 
and cultural activities is ensured. This can be seen as an adjustment towards CSO con-
cerns as the Civil Society Working Group on Scientific Information lobbied for this 
very purpose and was supported by Australia and the Fiji Islands.28  
In the period between PrepCom2 and PrepCom3, the negotiators even verbally took 
over proposals of the Working Group on Scientific Information. An example would be 
the following paragraph on the use of peer-to-peer technology: 
“Promote the use of peer-to-peer technology to share personal scientific knowl-
edge and pre-prints and reprints written by scientific authors who have waived 
their right to payment” (WSIS 22.08.2003: section 39).   
In the same document another formulation was directly taken from the input given by 
the same Working Group:  
“Establish a programme, funded by the UN (or its agencies), to create a world-
wide portal to open access journals and books, and an open archive for scien-
tific information” (WSIS 22.08.2003: section 15e).   
However, civil society representatives evaluated this as being only “an incomplete 
summary of our recommendations”29. The Scientific Information Working Group fur-
ther demanded financial support for Open Access Journals and Open Access archives, a 
worldwide scientific Open Archive, as well as the distribution of free CDS containing 
Open Access contents to transition countries (WSIS 21.03.2003a: Working Group on 
Scientific Information Contribution). These demands have not been adopted in the 
documents.  
                                                 
28  Muguet, Francis, Informal Report on the Intersessional Meeting, Paris, France, www.wsis-pct.org.  
29  Ibid.  
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Thus, the working documents that were released between PrepCom2 and PrepCom3 
reflected general demands that were brought forward by CSOs and adopted concrete 
drafting proposals with regard to Open Access. However, during PrepCom3 some of the 
respective sections were changed considerably. The paragraphs 21-22 have been de-
leted30 and were replaced by a text promoting “equitable access”, an entirely different 
concept than Open Access. The Working Group on Scientific Information criticises this 
term as being inappropriate:  
“This word is fitted for commercial transactions related to commercial informa-
tion. It should not be used to replace “Open Access” because it would imply that 
scientific information, public domain information and any other information that 
is created for free, should be subjected to trade rules” (Civil Society Working 
Group on Content and Themes 30.10.2003).   
The non-paper released in November represented another step-back from the earlier 
Declaration. Open Access is not mentioned to any further extent, it is fully replaced by 
“universal” or “equitable” access. Just before the summit, the concept of Open Access 
was again included in the documents, as the section on the promotion of peer-to-peer 
technology which originates from the civil society Working Group on Scientific Infor-
mation.  
Overall, the mainstream CSO concerns on IPR have been referred to in the official 
WSIS documents. The existing IPR regime was challenged insofar as the importance of 
a wide dissemination of knowledge was acknowledged. Free and open source software 
as well as open access to scientific literature was promoted. Yet those concerns were 
only addressed cautiously and more advanced concessions to the CSO claims have been 
taken back during the drafting process. The minority position of content creators and 
publishers that lobbied for the maintenance of the existing IPR regime is represented in 
the documents. This, however, can not be traced back to their input but is more indebted 
to the fact that important states such as the USA as well as business actors shared their 
position. The concerns raised by indigenous peoples have not been considered, although 
a paragraph was devoted to them in earlier versions of the Action Plan.  
                                                 
30  Francis Muguet, chair of the Working Group on Scientific Information, recounts in a report on PrepCom3 that a 
mistake by one diplomat was responsible for the disappearance of the term Open Access from the working docu-
ments: “A delegation demanded that article 21-22 be deleted in the Declaration of Principles. According to sev-
eral sources, this request was simply the consequence of a material mistake. This paragraph has been circled in 
red during internal discussions, and one diplomat mistakenly interpreted the “red circling” as an instruction to re-
quest deletion during the plenary. Therefore the list quoting “Open Access” has been deleted” (www.wsis-
pct.org). 
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Most importantly, the adjustments towards CSO claims varied over time. At an ear-
lier period in the negotiation process the documents contained a variety of suggestions 
by CSOs on IPR because the governments’ positions were still changeable. Later, many 
CSO claims again vanished from the documents. In the last weeks and months of the 
process, when the date of the summit approached, states fixed their positions and 
needed to find compromises on many issues. Finally, therefore, many CSO ideas van-
ished again from the documents, probably because they were too far-reaching and con-
trary to the least common denominator that was agreed upon.  
Communication rights  
In 1948 the UN laid the foundation for a generally accepted human rights framework 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It touches upon information and 
communication issues with the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19), 
the right to privacy (Article 12) and the right to freely participate in cultural life and to 
protect scientific, literary and artistic work of authors (Article 27). Despite this frame-
work, the implementation is advanced to highly different degrees in the UN member 
countries. Therefore, at WSIS, the centrality of human rights related to information and 
communication in the official documents was a hotly debated issue. Most controversial 
was the demand for a new human right, called the ‘right to communicate’ or ‘communi-
cation rights’.  
Indeed, the debate about a right to communicate is not new. The term was introduced 
by Jean D’Arcy in 1969 who stated that  
“the time will come when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will have 
to encompass a more extensive right than man’s right to information (…) This is 
the right of men to communicate” (cited in Hamelink 2003: 156).   
Communication rights were also central to the debate about a ‘New World Information 
and Communication Order’ (NWICO) in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in the 1970s and 80s. Here a balanced flow of infor-
mation was demanded by non-aligned developing countries, supported by the Soviet 
Union, which led to a Cold-War-style éclat with the withdrawal of the United States and 
the United Kingdom in 1984 and 1985 respectively from UNESCO (Ó Siochrú 2004). 
Recently, the debate gained prominent support from Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
who said that “millions of people in the poorest countries are still excluded from the 
‘right to communicate’, increasingly seen as a fundamental human right” (Annan 
17.05.2003).  
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Proponents of a right to communicate argue that communication is and needs to be at 
the heart of the Information Society31. They can be roughly divided into two fractions: 
Some conceptualise the right to communicate as an additional human right, as a neces-
sary amendment of the human rights framework in the light of new information and 
communication technologies. Especially at the WSIS, the civil society campaign Com-
munication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS) lobbied for a right to communi-
cate as an additional human right, but mostly informally. CRIS organised the World 
Forum on Communication Rights alongside the WSIS.  
Others oppose the introduction of a new human right but promote a more coherent 
implementation of existing human rights. They argue that communication rights are an 
umbrella term for already existing human rights related to communication and informa-
tion, for example the human rights organisations Article 19 and the World Press Free-
dom Committee (WPFC).  
Especially countries with strong democratic traditions were reluctant to accept the 
idea of a new human right to communicate. They feared that the WSIS documents re-
flected a backdrop behind the status of the human rights regime from 1948 as it had 
developed so far, which would be of much greater concern than the invention of a new 
human right. In addition, countries which are often criticised for the lack of implemen-
tation of already existing human rights related to information and communication, e.g. 
China, oppose a right to communicate. Kuhlen (2003) summarises the reasons of those 
who oppose this right:  
“It is not only the memory of the old NWICO debate, it is the concern that exist-
ing power structures and property rights are likely to be put into question by di-
rect democratic, participative, and knowledge-sharing behaviours within the 
communicative paradigm” (Kuhlen 2003: 57).   
Key issues that guide this analysis are the promotion or neglect of communication rights 
or a right to communicate; the definition of communication rights or a right to commu-
nicate; and the connection of those rights to the general human rights framework. 
Civil Society Argumentative Input 
Most of the CSOs that made statements on communication rights or a right to commu-
nicate promoted this concept; only a minority group explicitly opposed it. However, 
those who favour it have differing views on how such a right should be defined and how 
it is connected to existing human rights.  
Some pushed for the creation of an additional human right to communicate:  
                                                 
31  Many of those would prefer the term Information and Communication Society to underline the importance of 
communication. 
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“Communication rights should be fully recognised as a fundamental and univer-
sal human right to be protected and promoted in the information society” (WSIS 
Civil Society 15.01.2003).   
Traditional human rights activists argue differently. They describe communication 
rights as an umbrella concept which includes all human rights related to communication 
and information: 
“The right to communicate should not be conceived as a new and independent 
right but rather as an umbrella term, encompassing within it a group of related, 
existing rights” (Article 19 14.02.2003).   
In the course of the negotiation process, CSOs incorporated this latter strand of argu-
mentation more and more. In the final Civil Society Declaration many universal human 
rights relevant to information and communication processes, together with access to the 
means of communication, are described as being the essence of communication rights.   
“(…) every person must have access to the means of communication and must be 
able to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes 
the right to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. Similarly the right to privacy, the 
right to access public information and the public domain of knowledge, and 
many other universal human rights of specific relevance to information and 
communication processes, must also be upheld. Together with access, all these 
communication rights and freedoms must be actively guaranteed for all in 
clearly written national laws and enforced with adequate technical require-
ments” [own accentuation] (WSIS 08.12.2003: 3).   
Contrarily, an earlier version of the Civil Society Declaration focused on the distinct-
iveness of a right to communication in comparison to other human rights.   
“Freedom of expression can be seen as addressing the formulation and content 
of communication, whereas the right to communicate focuses on the means and 
processes required to make and convey expression. (…) The right to communi-
cate thus addresses both the critical day-to-day communications needs of peo-
ple, and a requirement necessary for the protection of other rights. Communica-
tion is considered by many in the world community as a distinct human right 
because the probability is sufficiently high that its absence could impede the 
lives and livelihoods of individuals, communities and whole societies” [own ac-
centuation] (WSIS 26.09.2003a).   
These differing perspectives of those who favour a right to communicate derive from 
diverse definitions. Those who depict communication rights as a generic term either 
characterise this right as being the total sum of all human rights related to information 
and communication or, rather vaguely, as “the right of every individual or community to 
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have its stories and views heard” (Article 19 14.02.2003). Those who promote the need 
for an additional human right define communication rights more precisely and focus on 
the access to the means of communication. The African NGO Coopération-Solidarité-
Développement for example describes it as “l’inaliénable liberté de tous les hommes et 
femmes dans le choix de leur mode de communication ainsi que son contenu”  
(CSDPTT 06.01.2003). Fair and equitable access is the essence of a right to communi-
cate (Human Rights in the Information Society HRIS Caucus 16.07.2003).  
The proponents of a right to communicate justify their perspective with the impor-
tance of communication as “the foundation of all societal organization” (CPSR 
31.05.2003). The introduction of a right to communicate would lead to “the strengthen-
ing of the political, economic, social and cultural lives of our people” (Asian NGOs 
07.12.2002). Communication rights are seen as a possibility to challenge media concen-
tration, to enable access to information for those excluded, to contribute to a censorship-
free society and to be the basis for innovation, development, new ideas and economic 
growth (Civil Society Contribution 17.07.2003).  
There are some CSOs, again mostly journalistic associations and unions, which take 
a critical stance on communication rights.  
“There are serious doubts about the scope, intention and impact of this right 
and the IFJ believes the objective of this right can be obtained through applica-
tion of existing rights. Therefore the IFJ would only support the inclusion of this 
right in the context of the existing Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, always provided this does not create any obstacle to freedom of 
expression and press freedom.” (IFJ 30.05.2003)   
Others reject the concept entirely: 
“Without a clear need being demonstrated, no ‘right of communication’ should 
be introduced or recommended. In fact, such a right, if not well defined, may 
conflict with Article 19. This cannot be tolerated” (IPA 29.05.2003).   
To conclude, most CSOs promote communication rights or a right to communicate be-
cause of the key role of communication for societies and the importance of access to the 
means of communication. The definition of communication rights varies depending on 
how it is connected to the general human rights framework. Most people conceived it as 
a generic term comprising existing human rights related to communication and informa-
tion. Other CSOs argue that communication rights should be understood as an addi-
tional human right, distinguished from other human rights such as the freedom of ex-
pression and opinion. A minority of CSOs rejects a right to communicate.  
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Tracing CSO Input in the Drafting Process on Communication Rights 
Communication rights did not loom large in the official WSIS working documents. In 
the Action Plan the concept was not mentioned at all, in the Declarations its salience 
diminished over time. In the end a right to communicate was not referred to in the Dec-
laration, but the salience of communications for society has been mentioned in a manner 
which could be understood to be a remnant of the communication rights debate:  
WSIS Declaration, 12.12.2003, section 4  
(…) Communication is a fundamental social process, a basic human need and the foundation of all social 
organization. It is central to the Information Society. Everyone, everywhere should have the opportunity 
to participate and no one should be excluded from the benefits the Information Society offers.   
Communication rights have been brought onto the agenda at the Western Asia Regional 
Conference that took place in Beirut (Lebanon) on 4-6 February 2003.  
“The right to communicate and the right to access information for citizens and 
nations, as well as the recognition and application of intellectual property rights 
and the principle of free flow of information, should be part and parcel of human 
rights fundamentals” (WSIS 06.02.2003).   
Instantly, the concept was taken over in the Declaration, but with the status of a basic 
human need, not a human right: “The right to communicate and the right to access in-
formation for citizens should be considered a basic human need” (WSIS 25.02.2003: 
section 18). A similar paragraph appeared later, although communication rights were 
then watered down so that in the end they were just “fundamental to the Information 
Society” (WSIS 21.03.2003b: section 21). 
At the Intersessional Meeting in Paris the discussion on communication rights was 
stimulated by a Brazilian proposal. As a new option for the first paragraph dealing with 
human rights, Brazil suggested that one should recognise communication rights as a 
human right and justified its position in detail: 
“We recognize the right to communicate and the right to access information and 
knowledge as fundamental human rights. Everyone, everywhere should have the 
opportunity to participate in the information society and no one should be ex-
cluded from the benefits it offers. In a world based on knowledge and informa-
tion, the right to communicate and the right to access information and knowl-
edge are essential requirements to the attainment of other internationally recog-
nized human rights, including the right to freedom of expression, universal ac-
cess to the information and communications infrastructure and to the Internet is 
essential to the Information Society” (WSIS 18.07.2003: section 1A).   
Brazil took up the demands voiced by CSOs using this suggestion. The right to commu-
nicate was not only mentioned, but it was also defined as a distinct human right. Its sali-
ence was justified with its effect of putting forward other human rights. Despite  posi-
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tive reception of this suggestion by civil society (German Civil Society 28.08.2003), the 
section vanished again and in the following versions of the Declaration communication 
rights were not mentioned again to any further extent.  
It seems that at least section 4 of the final Declaration, which mentions the key role 
of communication for the society, was inspired by CSOs. The idea that “communication 
is a fundamental social process, a basic human need and the foundation of all social 
organization” first emerged at the beginning of PrepCom3 (WSIS 19.09.2003: section 
4), at the same time as the notions on communication rights disappeared. This proposal 
can be ascribed to civil society, which justified their demand for communication rights 
with the key role of communication for the society. The Civil Society Coordination 
Group, for example, stated that “communication is a basic human need” (Civil Society 
Coordination Group 05.02.2003) and that “communication is a fundamental human 
need, indispensable for the organization of societies” (Civil Society Coordination Group 
12.09.2002). The final Civil Society Declaration also refers to that definition of com-
munication:  
“We reaffirm that communication is a fundamental social process, a basic hu-
man need and a foundation of all social organisation. Everyone, everywhere, at 
any time should have the opportunity to participate in communication processes 
and no one should be excluded from their benefits” (WSIS 08.12.2003).  
In conclusion, the section that substitutes the idea of communication rights in the final 
official WSIS Declaration seems to have been inspired by civil society input. Addition-
ally, although the outcome was not in line with CSO demands for communication 
rights, the drafting process showed that CSO concerns were discussed and taken into 
consideration. At the Intersessional Meeting communication rights were referred to as 
human rights in the working documents because of the request and drafting proposal of 
Brazil. Later this concept vanished again, so that the final documents show no adjust-
ments to CSO concerns with regard to communication rights or a right to communicate. 
This demonstrates, just as in the case of IPR, that the responsiveness of WSIS towards 
CSO demands depended on the point in time of the negotiation process and was higher 
at an earlier period in time and lower nearer the starting date of the Summit. 
CONCLUSION  
Based on the ideal of deliberative democracy and the claim that CSOs should be in-
cluded in the decision-making procedures in order to generate legitimate outcomes, the 
World Summit on the Information Society was presented as a likely case for a delibera-
tive policy-process. Indeed, the preconditions for CSO participation – access, transpar-
ency and inclusion – were unprecedented at the start of this world summit. The WSIS 
provided favourable conditions for CSO participation. They had access to the negotia-
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tions of the preparatory phase as well as the summit. In addition, CSOs could easily 
access all policy and background documents; this indicates that the policy process was 
transparent. Yet, the WSIS process did not take sufficient measures to include marginal-
ised voices within civil society. The participation of CSOs did not lead to a substantial 
impact on the policy output.  
Despite the high aspirations of WSIS and the quite favourable formal conditions of 
civil society participation, the impact of civil society on the policy outcome remained 
relatively low. A content analysis of policy documents and civil society statements with 
regard to three selected issue areas – Internet governance, intellectual property rights 
and communication rights – revealed that CSOs were in many cases not able to influ-
ence the outcome. Their argumentative input only led to minor changes in the policy 
documents, mostly restricted to an early stage of the negotiation process. 
This is contradictory to the initial expectations that were derived from the normative 
deliberative approach to democracy. Factors other than the exchange of reasonable ar-
guments between state and non-state actors seem to have been decisive for the output of 
the WSIS. The imperative task for future research on the subject that derives from these 
results is to find reasons for this low impact. The results of the study suggest that the 
responsiveness of the WSIS process depended less on the influence of CSO arguments, 
but rather on the interests of governments, the structure of the problems discussed, and 
on the stage in the preparatory process at the time that the CSO arguments were dis-
cussed.  
The CSO influence was contingent on the willingness of states to support their argu-
ments. In some instances an adjustment took place because the CSO position was sup-
ported by a certain state, as the case of communication rights revealed in which Brazil 
achieved the adoption of a specific clause on a right to communicate in the interses-
sional period. The responsiveness of the WSIS process towards CSO arguments was to 
a large degree dependent on the power relationships between states and their willingness 
to listen to CSO expertise. For example, the discussion on Internet Governance was 
dominated by the opposing positions of two fractions of states, led by the USA on the 
one hand and China on the other. Therefore, CSOs were not able to give an input on the 
substance discussed; however, they were able to help with expertise and therefore were 
allowed a stronger role in the further discussions on Internet governance. Although the 
outcome of the Internet governance debate was in line with CSO demands, it was ulti-
mately dependent on powerful states and their interests. A causal relationship between 
the arguments of CSOs and an adjustment of the documents could not be detected. 
These results suggest that the negotiations were not following a rational discourse in 
which non-state as well as state actors were able to equally voice their arguments and in 
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which the better argument carries the day. Rather, the state actors’ interests and power 
were decisive for the policy outcome. 
Issues contested within civil society were less likely to lead to an adjustment towards 
their demands. The CSO position on Internet Governance was relatively coherent and 
their priority claims were reflected in the documents. The demand for a multi-
stakeholder approach to Internet governance was undisputed and it was reflected in the 
final documents of the WSIS. Additionally, the priority of CSOs in that debate was to 
strengthen the role of civil society in Internet governance. This priority was responded 
to in the Declaration and the Action Plan. Nevertheless, as was said before, the outcome 
can not only be traced back to CSO demands, but much more to state interests.  
The CSO positions on IPR and communication rights were more ambiguous. In the 
IPR debate different fractions within civil society had differing positions on the issue. 
Priority issues were also going in different directions, some organisations were primar-
ily lobbying for the Open Access cause, others for Free and Open Source Software. In 
the end, CSO arguments on IPR were only superficially reflected in the final docu-
ments. Though concrete proposals of CSOs with regard to FOSS and Open Access had 
been considered at some point in time of the preparatory process, they mostly vanished 
from the documents towards the end.  
Most civil society organisations lobbied for a right to communicate, but they dis-
agreed on how it should be defined and how it should relate to the existing human rights 
framework. A minority of CSOs strictly rejected a right to communicate. In the end the 
right to communicate was neither promoted nor mentioned in the WSIS documents. As 
CSOs did not have a common position on the promotion of a right to communicate, they 
were not able to influence the policy outcome in this respect. 
Responsiveness was highest at an earlier stage of the negotiation process when the 
positions of state actors were still to be determined and unresolved. Towards the end of 
the negotiations, the responsiveness to CSO arguments decreased. The debates on IPR 
and Communication Rights showed the same pattern in this respect. When these issues 
were first discussed in a substantial manner, which was mostly during the Intersessional 
Meeting in July, states seemed to be more open and responsive towards the ideas and 
propositions of CSOs. Their positions were not fixed at that stage and the expertise of 
CSOs was welcome. The documents included many proposals of CSOs between Prep-
Com2 and 3 and the ITU published additional reading and reference guides to stimulate 
the exchange of ideas. Towards the end of the negotiation process, when the states were 
impelled to find a consensus or at least a compromise based on the least common de-
nominator, states increasingly began to reject the arguments of CSOs. Many proposi-
tions of CSOs were deleted after PrepCom3 and the documents became shorter and 
vaguer. An exception to this pattern was the debate on Internet governance. Here, states 
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were in a stalemate from the outset of the discussions and civil society gained more and 
more influence over time.  
Therefore, on the basis of the empirical analysis, three hypotheses can be formulated 
as tentative results and starting points for future research:  
(1) The power and interests of states in the preparatory process are more decisive 
for the policy outcome than arguing and rational discourse, even in cases 
where an adjustment towards CSO positions can be detected.  
(2) The less contested an issue is within civil society, the more adjustments to-
wards CSO demands take place. 
(3) The responsiveness and justification vis-à-vis CSO arguments decrease to-
wards the end of the negotiations. They are higher at an earlier stage of the ne-
gotiations when the positions of state actors are still to be determined and are, 
as such, unresolved.  
Overall, the case of the World Summit on the Information Society indicates that favour-
able conditions for CSO participation alone do not necessarily provide a cure for the 
democratic deficit in international governance. The WSIS lacks democratic quality ac-
cording to the criteria that have been developed here when it comes to deliberative de-
mocracy, although CSOs were broadly enabled so that they could participate and con-
tribute to the negotiations. However, there was no rational discourse between civil soci-
ety, state actors and other observers at the WSIS. Even at such a showcase that the 
WSIS is, state power, the time set aside for the negotiation process and the character of 
the issues discussed seem to outweigh a deliberative policy process.  
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